Thursday, September 13, 2007

Hegel's absolute relation to the absolute

"When we say of things that they are finite, we understand thereby that they not have a determinateness...but that...non-being constitutes their nature and being...They are, but the truth of this being is their end. The finite...ceases to be; and its ceasing to be is not merely a possiblity, so that it could be without ceasing to be, but the being as such of finite things is to have the germ of disease as their being-within-self: the hour of their birth is the hour of their death. The thought of the finitude of things brings this sadness with it...and in the singleness of such determination there is no longer left to things an affirmative being distinct from their destiny to perish" (Hegel, G. 1969, p. 129).

Ah, Hegel, how you have been mistreated. How could you have written this - and in the Science of Logic of all books - and still be accused of being a rationalist (as if, anyway, it was a term of abuse) and not also be a man of real feeling.

"the point is, whether in thinking of the finite one holds fast to the being of finitude and lets the transitoriness and the ceasing-to-be cease to be" (Hegel, G. 1969, p. 130).